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INTRODUCTION
Researchers and government officials now recognize racial
disproportionality as a pressing problem facing the child welfare
system.' In this country, most children in foster care are children of
color.2 Black children are especially overrepresented in the child
welfare system:3 they make up about one-third of the nation's foster
care population, despite representing only 15 percent of the nation's
children.4 A black child is four times as likely as a white child to be
placed in foster care.5
Although alarming, these statistics do not reveal the spatial
dynamics of the child welfare system's racial disparities.6 State
custody of children has a racial geography. In the nation's cities,
child protection cases are concentrated in communities of color.7
Many poor black neighborhoods in particular have extremely high
rates of involvement by public child welfare agencies, especially
with respect to placement in foster care.8 In 1997, for example, one
in ten children in Central Harlem was in foster care.9 In Chicago,
1. See generally RACE MATTERS IN CHILD WELFARE: THE OVERREPRESENTATION OF
AFRICAN AMERICAN CHILDREN IN THE SYSTEM (Dennette M. Derezotes, John Poertner & Mark
F. Testa eds., 2005); DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE
(2002); ROBERT B. HILL, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF SOC. POLICY, SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH ON
DISPROPORTIONALITY IN CHILD WELFARE: AN UPDATE (2006), http://www.racemattersconsor
tium.org/docslBobHillPaper_- Final.pdf.
2. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE
AFCARS REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY 2005 ESTIMATES AS OF SEPTEMBER 2006 (13), at 2 (2006),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/statsresearchlafcars/tar/reportl3.pdf.
3. Child Welfare League of America, Children of Color 2004, http://ndas.cwla.org
researchinfo/minority-childl (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
4. See Child Welfare League of America, CWLA Fact Sheet and Relevant Research,
http://ndas.cwla.org/research-info/specialtopicla.asp (last visited Nov. 23, 2007) ("While
African American/Black children represented 15% of the total population under the age of 18,
they were 34% of the foster care population.").
5. Casey Family Programs, Child Welfare Fact Sheets, http://www.casey.org/Media
Center/MediaKit/FactSheet.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2007).
6. See FORDHAM UNIV. INTERDISCIPLINARY CTR. FOR FAMILY AND CHILD ADVOCACY, THE
RACIAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM: COMMUNITY IMPACT AND RESPONSE 5
(Dorothy Roberts, Leah Hill & Erik Pitchal eds., 2006), available at http://law.fordham.
eduldocuments/int-2RacialGeography.pdf [hereinafter RACIAL GEOGRAPHY].
7. Id. at 4-5.
8. Id. at 3.
9. Alyssa Katz, Mommy Nearest, CITY LIMITS MAG., June 2000, http://citylimits.org/
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most child protection cases are clustered in a few zip code areas,
which are almost exclusively African American."° Such overrepre-
sentation of black children in the foster care population represents
considerable state supervision and dissolution of families concen-
trated in these neighborhoods.1' Moreover, racial differences in
foster care placement rates affect more than an individual child's
risk of placement; they also affect his or her chances of growing up
in a neighborhood where foster care placement is prevalent. 12 The
racial geography of child welfare, then, "makes the child welfare
system a distinctively different institution for white and black
children in America."' 3
What is the sociopolitical impact of this spatial concentration of
child welfare supervision in poor, black neighborhoods? Although
researchers have investigated the reasons behind racial disparities
in the child welfare system, 4 the community impact of these dis-
parities remains obscure.' 5 During the summer of 2005, 1 conducted
a small case study to begin to explore the effects of concentrated
child welfare agency involvement in black neighborhoods. 6 The
study conducted and analyzed the results of in-depth interviews
with twenty-five black women living in Woodlawn, a black neighbor-
hood on the South Side of Chicago. Woodlawn is an area exposed to
a particularly high level of involvement by the Illinois Department
of Children and Family Services (DCFS). The study sought to
content/articles/articleview.cfm?articlenumber=337.
10. See Mark F. Testa & Frank F. Furstenberg, The Social Ecology of Child
Endangerment, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 237, 238, 255 (Margaret K. Rosenheim
et al. eds., 2002); Children and Family Research Center, CFRC Factbook, http://xinia.social.u
iuc.edu/outcomes/factbooklindicator9a.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2007) (follow the "Compute
Table" hyperlink related to the "Chicago Community Area" of interest) (displaying foster care
statistics by Chicago neighborhood).
11. HILL, supra note 1, at 27 (quoting ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 236-37, 240-41).
12. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Community Dimension of State Child Protection, 34 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 23, 31 (2005).
13. Id. See generally RACIAL GEOGRAPHY, supra note 6.
14. See, e.g., Mark E. Courtney et al., Race and Child Welfare Services: Past Research and
Future Directions, 75 CHILD WELFARE 99, 110, 112 (1996); Wendy G. Lane et al., Racial
Differences in the Evaluation of Pediatric Fractures for Physical Abuse, 288 JAMA 1603, 1608-
09 (2002); HILL, supra note 1, at 8.
15. Roberts, supra note 12, at 25.
16. See Dorothy E. Roberts, High Rates of Child Welfare Agency Involvement in African-
American Neighborhoods: The Impact on Community and Civic Life (Feb. 5, 2006)
(unpublished working paper, on file with author).
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evaluate how the involvement of child welfare agencies affects
community and civic life and shapes residents' attitudes about
government and self-governance.
17
Almost all of Woodlawn's 27,000 residents are African
American.1 8 Furthermore, "Woodlawn is also one of Chicago's
poorest neighborhoods.... Half of the female-headed households with
children in Woodlawn live in poverty."' 9 Additionally, the neighbor-
hood has one of the highest rates of foster care placement in
Chicago. At the end of 2005, almost 200 of Woodlawn's approxi-
mately 9,000 children were in state-supervised substitute care,
living either with relatives or strangers."
Conversely, in the vast majority of Chicago neighborhoods, the
foster care rate is less than half of Woodlawn's. 2' Although several
other poor African American neighborhoods, such as Grand
Boulevard and the Near West Side, have double Woodlawn's rate,22
there is not a single white neighborhood in Chicago whose children
are placed in foster care at a level even approaching these black
neighborhoods.23
Although the study set out to investigate the ways in which
intense child welfare agency involvement affected residents' social
networks and civic involvement, I discovered three profound con-
tradictions in residents' relationships to the child welfare system. In
particular, resident responses highlighted paradoxical views on
the role of caseworkers, foster parents, and parents. They described
17. Id.
18. Census Data: Chicago Community, http://xinia.social.uiuc.edu/outcomes/census
chidata.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2007) (displaying demographic information for all Chicago
neighborhoods).
19. Dorothy Roberts, The Racial Geography of State Child Protection 6-7 (Inst. for Policy
Research, Northwestern Univ., Working Paper No. 07-06, 2007), available at http://www.
northwestern.edu/ipr/publications/papers/2007/wpO706.pdf. This paper is now a chapter in
a forthcoming book, NEW LANDSCAPES OF INEQUALITY (Jane Collins, Micaela di Leonardo &
Brett Williams eds., forthcoming 2008).
20. Census Data: Chicago Community, supra note 18; CFRC Factbook, supra note 10
(select "Woodlawn" from the "By Chicago Community Area" dropbox; then follow the
"Compute Table" hyperlink) (displaying foster care statistics for Woodlawn).
21. See CFRC Factbook, supra note 10 (allowing user to display foster care statistics for
individual Chicago neighborhoods).
22. Id. (selecting "Grand Boulevard" and "Near West Side," respectively, to display
relevant foster care statistics).
23. Roberts, supra note 12, at 37.
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caseworkers as both meddling investigators and appreciated
helpers.24 They believed that some foster parents take care of
children for the money, but also that some need more money to take
proper care of their foster children.25 Lastly, they resented child
protection agencies' pervasive regulation of their lives, yet relied on
the resources that these agencies provide.26
Scholars have noted the tension in the child welfare system's
design. It is a system that seeks both to help and punish poor
parents, based on a philosophy grounded in child protection.27 The
residents' responses exemplify this tension and show how it has
intensified as the safety net dwindles in poor inner-city neighbor-
hoods and changes the child welfare system's institutional function.
Part I examines the three paradoxes that emerged from responses
of residents about DCFS involvement in their neighborhood. Part II
considers the implications of these paradoxes in light of the growth
of kinship foster care. Part III then discusses the relationship
between child welfare's fundamental contradiction, arising from the
system's dual functions as both investigator and service provider, to
the dwindling safety net in poor inner-city neighborhoods. Families
in these neighborhoods must increasingly rely on coercive state
agencies for the economic support they need. Thus, the child welfare
system's racial geography is connected to the geography of social
service provision.28 1 conclude that the growing yet overlooked role
of child welfare agencies in the shrinking welfare state heightens
the paradox inherent in the U.S. approach to child welfare, which
centers on the punitive regulation of poor parents, and makes
change more imperative than ever.
24. See infra Part I.A.
25. See infra Part I.B.
26. See infra Part I.C.
27. JANE WALDFOGEL, THE FUTURE OF CHILD PROTECTION: How To BREAK THE CYCLE OF
ABUSE AND NEGLECT 81 (1998); Leroy H. Pelton, Child Welfare Policy and Practice: The Myth
of Family Preservation, 67 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 545, 551 (1997).
28. See infra notes 100-09 and accompanying text.
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I. THE THREE PARADOXES
The residents' responses revealed three key contradictions in
views about DCFS involvement in Woodlawn and the role of
caseworkers, foster parents, and parents. The women described
caseworkers as both investigators and helpers, foster parents as
both greedy and altruistic, and parents as both subjects of regula-
tion and recipients of support. These contradictory views are all
related to child welfare agencies' dual nature, which ties services for
families to investigation, coercion, and child removal.
A. Caseworkers as Investigators and Helpers
The women interviewed in Woodlawn poignantly expressed the
tension created by caseworkers' dual roles as both investigator
and supporter of neighborhood families. The child welfare system
employs social workers who are responsible for providing services
to families. Yet, these same service providers also investigate
parents alleged to have maltreated their children and coerce parents
to comply with rehabilitative measures by threatening to take away
their children permanently.29 Social work professor Leroy Pelton
emphasized the threat to family integrity created by the child
welfare system's dual function of simultaneously coercing parents
while trying to help them.3 ° In particular, he observed:
The investigative/coercive/child-removal role diminishes, ham-
pers, and overwhelms the helping role within the dual-role
structure of public child-welfare agencies, as huge and increas-
ingly larger portions of their budgets are devoted to investiga-
tion and foster care, with little money left over for preventive
and supportive services to combat the impermanency of chil-
dren's living arrangements. 1
29. See Leroy H. Pelton, Has Permanency Planning Been Successful? No, in
CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES IN CHILD WELFARE 268, 271 (Eileen Gambrill & Theodore J. Stein
eds., 1994).
30. See id. at 268-71.
31. Id. at 271.
886 [Vol. 49:881
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Thus, agencies fail to maintain a balance between coercion and
support of families because their intimidating role tends to domi-
nate.
Some Woodlawn residents viewed caseworkers with suspicion and
believed that they unnecessarily disrupted family and community
life.32 They felt that caseworkers' investigations were often unwar-
ranted and their responses overzealous.33 Some portrayed casework-
ers as spies who infiltrated the neighborhood to gather evidence
against parents. According to twenty-six-year-old Cassie:
[Y]ou got to watch what you do and what you say and all this,
'cause you don't know who you could be talking to. Out on the
street you don't know who you could be talking to.... She could
be DCFS, writing down stuff, taking notes, all of that, and you
don't know who she is. So you have to be careful. You have to be
very careful.34
Parents perceive caseworkers' use of a foreign standard to judge
neighborhood families as part of the problem. Pearl, a counselor
who provided services for DCFS, but who also had relatives and
neighbors involved with the agency, said, "I think sometimes the
[DCFS caseworkers] who do the interviews come from a different
walk of life, you know, and when they come from a different walk of
life, they see things a little different than people within the home
community."35
Additionally, caseworkers' investigative roles spread beyond those
performed by DCFS to influence relationships in the neighborhood.
Many of the women reported distrust among neighbors created by
the pervasive DCFS surveillance of families.36 Respondents believed
that residents often falsely accused others of child abuse to seek
retribution against them. Tiara, a twenty-four-year-old whose close
friend was the subject of a DCFS investigation, complained:
Teachers are even using it for revenge too. If you even went to
school with these teachers and they made it all right in their
32. Roberts, supra note 16, at 17-29.
33. See id. at 29-31.
34. Id. at 29. Pseudonyms are used for all the respondents quoted in this Essay.
35. Id. at 19.
36. Id. at 29-31.
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career and now they're teaching in your community and your
kids is one of their students, that if she didn't like you unknow-
ingly all this time since high school ... you got teachers that set
you up at the end of the school year. 7
In this fashion, the presence of DCFS has not only bred distrust
between residents and caseworkers, but also among residents.
Despite their criticism of caseworker surveillance, however, the
women also expressed gratitude for the support caseworkers
provided." Francis, a forty-eight-year-old whose daughter was the
subject of a DCFS investigation, explained:
You can get some [caseworkers] that will help you. They helped
[my daughter] get an apartment, furniture, you know, every-
thing they did. You have to know how to work these agencies.
Like, you know, anything else.... She helped us with a lot of
programs that a lot of people don't know about. You know,
because a lot of workers won't tell you about the different
programs that they have for you to help you.... A lot of people
don't know that if you cooperate with them, they'll help you
more.
39
Francis and her neighbors were well aware of the paradox
created by caseworkers' coercive and supportive roles. According to
the Woodlawn residents, although caseworkers were often unfair
investigators to be feared, they were also potential sources of useful
information and material aid for families. Some residents, like
Francis, developed strategies for negotiating this paradox to gain
the most advantage from the system that is supposed to serve them.
As the next Section discusses, many residents nevertheless believed
that caseworkers should increase their surveillance of some foster
parents in the neighborhood.
37. Id. at 30.
38. Id. at 36-37 (discussing neighborhood gratitude for financial aid).
39. Id.
[Vol. 49:881888
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B. Foster Parents as Greedy and Altruistic
In May 2006, foster parents in Washington State became the first
in the nation to unionize.4 ° Washington foster parents joined the
state government's largest labor union, the Washington Federation
of State Employees.41 Frustrated by state government's disregard of
their concerns, the foster parents may next pursue collective
bargaining rights with the state to influence their remuneration and
working conditions.42 Some people may find it strange that foster
parents would unionize because they are supposed to be altruistic
saviors who rescue children from abusive parents and treat them as
their own.43
This idealized role, however, is not the legal relationship foster
parents have with respect to the children in their care. In Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform,44 the
Supreme Court upheld limitations on the rights of foster parents on
the grounds that a foster family has "its source in state law and
contractual arrangements."45 Foster parents receive government
stipends for each child in their care,46 and the state often gives them
other forms of assistance, including medical services, counseling,
clothing vouchers, respite care, and training.4" Daniele and Steve
Baxter, who have fostered more than 700 children and share the
presidency of the Foster Parents Association of Washington State,
described their position on business cards as "professional parent."4
Yet Republican State Senator Joe Zarelli criticized the union effort
for being contrary to foster care's nature as voluntary care for needy
children.4" "From my perspective, the whole idea of opening your
40. Curt Woodward, Foster Parents in State Are Nation's First To Join Union, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 19, 2006, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local270817
_fosterl9.html.
41. Id.
42. Id.; Associated Press, State Foster Parents Seek Greater Power Through Union, June
17, 2006, available at http://Komoradio.com/news/archive/4189401.html [hereinafter State
Foster Parents].
43. Woodward, supra note 40 (citing view of foster parents as volunteers).
44. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
45. Id. at 845.
46. Woodward, supra note 40.
47. State Foster Parents, supra note 42.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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home to children that need parental role models is one of volun-
teerism and not one of employment," Zarelli explained.0 "You don't
do it for what you get, other than directly from the kids in the form
of appreciation."'" Although foster parents are paid contractors, as
Senator Zarelli's comments show, many still view them as altruistic
child savers.
The women interviewed in Woodlawn had a similarly mixed view
of foster parents. Despite their gratitude for the material support
DCFS gave to foster parents, many of the women in Woodlawn
commented on the harmful effect of financial incentives associated
with becoming a foster parent." They believed that foster parents
often took poor care of children because they were in the business
"just for the money."53 Forty-five-year-old child care worker, Estelle,
complained:
I know people who ... just used the children, you know, just
'cause they get paid, you know. I mean, you know, if you want a
child, you take care of the child and you should want it from the
heart instead of just because you get the money. I know it's a lot
of people who are just using the children.54
Aisha similarly observed:
A lot of people do it just for the money. A lot of people are taking
these people's children for the money. Not that they care
anything about the child. I know from my grandmother that
sometimes that people do not care about the child as long as that
check is rolling in every month, they will let the child stay
there.5
Francis, who was grateful for the help a caseworker extended to her
daughter, also questioned foster parents' motives:
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Roberts, supra note 16, at 37-38.
53. Id. at 37.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 37-38.
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Because foster people, they don't give a care about them kids. All
they want is the money, you know. And then a lot of times you
see foster kids with foster parents, and the kids look like some
thrift store reject, you know. And you get money for these kids,
ain't no way they should look like they look, you know.5"
As illustrated in these excerpts, many of the Woodlawn interviewees
cynically viewed foster parents as profit maximizers.
Paradoxically, the women also believed that DCFS should be
more involved in foster homes because some foster parents were
only interested in the money and because the agency did not
support foster parents enough. Beverly, who was involved with
DCFS as both a foster child and as the adoptive mother of her niece,
expressed such sentiments about the agency:
I don't think they're involved enough. Why? Because I believe
that what they need to do before they even put children in other
people's homes, relative or whoever.... [is] to observe the person's
house, the person whose house they're going to put the children
in, at least a month before. Why I say that, because a lot of
people get these kids, they start this for the money, the kids are
still being neglected, and I don't think DCFS is going out
checking on them enough.57
Despite her suspicion of some foster parents' motives, Beverly also
called for greater financial assistance for foster parents:
There's another lady over here, she got her nephew and she was
complaining about how they weren't sending her no money, like
$80 she got. First she had one baby, she wasn't getting nothing
for that baby.... You need money to take care of these kids. I'm
not asking for a million dollars, but give me something to work
with. And that kind of thing people have problems with, with the
DCFS. The money thing.58
The tension these women expressed appears to stem in part from
their distrust of others' motives for being foster parents while
56. Id.
57. Id. at 41.
58. Id. at 38.
2007]
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wanting greater remuneration for their own foster parenting.
By virtue of its overreliance on substitute care for children, the
state creates financial incentives for bad caregivers and provides
insufficient support for good ones. Additionally, the women's
concerns also stem from the child welfare system's preference for
paying foster parents to care for children rather than providing
adequate support directly to poor mothers. Although Congress
restructured welfare in 1996 by abolishing the federal entitlement
to public assistance for children, foster care remains a well-funded
entitlement program;59 of course, it is primarily foster parents who
can benefit financially from this program, not poor mothers
themselves.
C. Parents as Subjects of Regulation and Recipients of Support
This pinpoints the heart of the contradictions that marked the
lives of the women interviewed in Woodlawn. I went to Woodlawn
to test my hypothesis that the concentration of intense child
welfare agency involvement in black neighborhoods had a disrup-
tive impact on community life. On one hand, the women interviewed
confirmed my theory. They described how DCFS interfered with
their parental authority, how it caused family fights over the
placement of children, how it made neighbors distrust each other,
and how it damaged children's ability to form healthy, long-lasting
social bonds.6 ° On the other hand, they also responded in unantici-
pated ways.
When the women were asked to rate DCFS involvement in
Woodlawn as too involved, not involved enough, or involved just the
right amount, I expected everyone to shout, 'Too involved!" and
demand that the agency leave them alone. To my surprise, most
of the women answered that DCFS was not involved enough.6 '
Although they criticized the agency's distortion of neighborhood
59. See Julie Shraver, What the Welfare Law May Mean for Certain Recipients, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 23, 1996, at A22; Jean Tepperman, Foster Care: The Last Entitlement, CHILD.
ADVOC., Nov.-Dec. 1998, available at http://www.4children.orgtnews/entl198.htm. Child
welfare, foster care, and adoption assistance programs are authorized under Titles IV-B and
IV-E of the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-629 (2006) (Title IV-B); 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-
679b (2006) (Title IV-E).
60. Roberts, supra note 16, at 17-31.
61. Id. at 35-43.
[Vol. 49:881892
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relationships, most nevertheless expressed a desire for greater
DCFS presence in Woodlawn to meet the material needs of its
struggling families.".
Many respondents understood the agency's function not only to
investigate parents, but also as a chief financial resource for
families. 3 Positive comments about DCFS typically concerned its
financial support for mothers, foster parents, or foster children and
not its protection of children from abuse and neglect. Twenty-seven-
year-old Angela, who had been in foster care, explained:
They're doing a good job [in Woodlawn].... Because it does help
them out with their, you know, financial wise, pay bills and stuff
like that, they help them out, they do give them money for
keeping the kids too.... Because I know the caseworkers are so
nice because, like I said my husband, his mom had adoptive kids
and she get $2,500 to the kids, a month alone.'
Thus, the Woodlawn women valued DCFS's financial support, in
spite of the corresponding surveillance.
The child welfare system exacts an onerous price: it requires poor
mothers to relinquish custody of their children in exchange for state
support needed to care for them.6" Those women who wanted greater
DCFS presence in Woodlawn, however, did not accept the terms
of its current involvement uncritically.66 In fact, many condemned
the agency's narrow role rooted in investigating families rather
than helping them.67 Michelle, thirty-four, who helped to raise her
nephew when her sister was investigated by DCFS, movingly
observed that the agency responded only to allegations of child
abuse rather than family need:
The way I see it is that [people in Woodlawn] don't look like
DCFS can really help them. Like I said, the advertisement, it
just says abuse. If you being abused, this is the number you call,
62. See id.
63. Id. at 36-37.
64. Id.
65. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Kinship Care and the Price of State Support for Children, 76
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1619, 1631 (2001).
66. See Roberts, supra note 16, at 38-41.
67. Id.
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this is the only way you gonna get help. It doesn't say if I'm in
need of counseling, or if I'm in need of my children don't have
shoes, if I just can't provide groceries even though I may have
seven kids, but I only get a hundred something dollars food
stamps. And my work check only goes to bills. I can't feed eight
of us all off a hundred something dollar food stamps. So I'm
saying, they don't know that DCFS can help them in a positive
way. They only do negative things, they only take my children
away. I think that is the big issue. I don't want to lose my
children, so I'm not going to call DCFS for help because I only
see them take away children.6"
Mirroring this sentiment, many of the women in Woodlawn rejected
the linkage of family financial assistance with investigation and
child removal, preferring more financial support with less disrup-
tion of family relationships.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF FAMILY RELIANCE ON KINSHIP CARE
The tensions in caseworkers', foster parents', and parents' roles
have a particular significance in black neighborhoods because so
many foster children in those neighborhoods are placed with
relatives. Between 1986 and 1990, the proportion of foster children
living with relatives grew from 18 percent to 31 percent in twenty-
five states.69 In Illinois, for example, relative placements increased
232 percent in a five-year period.7" By 1997, there were at least as
many relative caregivers as traditional foster parents in California,
Illinois, and New York.71 Moreover, kinship care is a significant type
of out-of-home placement for black children in New York City,
Chicago, and Philadelphia.7 ' Kinship foster care, then, is a major
68. Id. at 39.
69. See Annie Woodley Brown & Barbara Bailey-Etta, An Out-of-Home Care System in
Crisis: Implications for African-American Children in the Child Welfare System, 76 CHILD
WELFARE 65, 76 (1997).
70. See James P. Gleeson, Kinship Care as a Child Welfare Service: The Policy Debate in
an Era of Welfare Reform, 75 CHILD WELFARE 419, 429 (1996).
71. See James P. Gleeson et al., Understanding the Complexity of Practice in Kinship
Foster Care, 76 CHILD WELFARE 801, 802 (1997).
72. See id. (indicating that the role of kinship care has risen drastically in New York City
since 1985); Maria Scannapieco & Sondra Jackson, Kinship Care: The African American
Response to Family Preservation, 41 SOC. WORK 190, 193 (1996) (noting that kinship care
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source of financial support for relatives' caregiving and is especially
crucial because kinship caregivers tend to have substantially lower
incomes than traditional foster parents.73
Many experts have heralded kinship foster care as a way of
enhancing the stability of placements and keeping African American
children in their extended families and their communities, thus
solving some concerns about the disproportionate removal of these
children from their parents.74 Because foster care assistance is also
the most generous form of welfare, however, it offers families an
incentive to remain in the kinship care system.
The two principal sources of public financial assistance for poor
families are Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) and
foster care benefits.75 All states offer TANF benefits both to relatives
caring for children and to generally needy families. 76 Foster care
stipends, however, are much larger than TANF benefits and unlike
TANF, which provides only a marginal monetary increase per child,
foster benefits are multiplied by each child in the home.77 A relative
caring for several children might receive two to four times as much
constitutes 67 percent of foster care homes in Philadelphia); Sarah Karp, Adoption Surge:
DCFS Policy Spells Pressure for Black Families, CHI. REP., Oct. 1999, available at
http://chicagoreporter.com/1999/10-99/1099-fostercare.htm (scroll down to "October, 1999")
(stating that kinship foster care represents 57 percent of Illinois's case load).
73. See Jill Duerr Berrick, When Children Cannot Remain Home: Foster Family Care and
Kinship Care, 8 FUTURE CHILD. 72, 77, 78 tbl.2 (1998).
74. See Scannapieco & Jackson, supra note 72, at 190-94.
75. See Laurie Hanson & Irene Opsahl, Kinship Caregiving: Law and Policy, 30
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 481, 483 (1996); see also Tepperman, supra note 59 (indicating that
TANF replaced AFDC).
Another important source of financial assistance for relative caregivers outside of foster
care is subsidized guardianship. Sacha Coupet, Swimming Upstream Against the Great
Adoption Tide: Making the Case for "Impermanence", 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 405, 429-37 (2005).
"Usually, the subsidy amount provided to guardians is somewhere between the amount of a
TANF child-only grant and a traditional foster care payment." Id. at 431-32. The subsidy rate
for guardians in the Illinois Subsidized Guardian Waiver Demonstration is the same as the
state's foster care and adoption subsidy rates. Id. at 432. Professor Coupet criticizes states'
preferences for adoption over guardianship "even though research reveals that subsidized
guardianship offers comparable permanency outcomes." Id. at 453.
76. See, e.g., Rob Geen, In the Interest of Children: Rethinking Federal and State Policies
Affecting Kinship Care, 58 POL'Y AND PRAC. PUB. HUM. RESOURCES 19, 21 (2000); Deborah
Gibbs et al., Between Two Systems: Children in TANF Child-Only Cases with Relative
Caregivers, 28 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 435, 437 (2006).
77. See Jennifer Ehrle & Rob Geen, Kin and Non-Kin Foster Care-Findings from a
National Survey, 24 CHILD. &YOUTH SERVS. REV. 15, 21 (2002); Hanson & Opsahl, supra note
75, at 483.
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in foster care payments as she would in welfare benefits.78 The
difference in levels of support highlights the government's willing-
ness to give more financial aid to children in state custody than to
children in the custody of their parents.
Federal law gives states wide latitude in creating the preferred
system of financial support for kin caregivers.79 Generally, the
amount of kinship foster care payments depends on whether the kin
caregiver is licensed by the state child welfare agency.80 Most states
require relatives to meet the same licensing requirements as
nonrelative foster parents in order to receive larger foster care
payments.1 Consequently, the strict requirements of the licensing
process entail another layer of intrusion in relatives' lives.82 In this
way, the level of state support for kinship caregivers directly
correlates with the level of regulation: the higher the payment, the
greater the intensity of state supervision.
Relatives can take advantage of the higher benefit payments
of foster care only by becoming involved in the child protection
system. Moreover, child welfare agencies .make services available
that address the parents' problems, such as drug treatment, mental
health counseling, and housing assistance, but only to families
under their supervision.83 According to Jill Duerr Berrick, director
of the Berkeley Center for Social Services Research, 'This disparity
spawns concerns that the foster care payment system may act as an
incentive for a troubled family to seek a formal agency-supervised
placement with kin rather than sharing child-rearing responsibili-
ties informally with the same relatives."'
Juxtaposed against such concerns is the strong support among
child welfare advocates for kinship care, because it helps to keep
foster children connected to their families and communities." Child
78. Ehrle & Geen, supra note 77, at 21; Hanson & Opsahl, supra note 75, at 483; see, e.g.,
Ian Urbina, With Parents Absent, Trying To Keep Child Care in the Family, N.Y. TIMES, July
23, 2006, at A16.
79. See Ehrle & Geen, supra note 77, at 21.
80. Id. at 23.
81. Id.
82. Note, The Policy of Penalty in Kinship Care, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1047, 1052 (1999).
83. Ehrle & Geen, supra note 77, at 31; Karp, supra note 72.
84. Berrick, supra note 73, at 75-76.
85. See, e.g., Jill Theresa Messing, From the Child's Perspective: A Qualitative Analysis
of Kinship Care Placements, 28 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REv. 1415, 1418-19 (2006). See
generally KINSHIP CARE: MAKING THE MOST OF A VALUABLE RESOURcE (Rob Geen ed., 2003).
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welfare researchers have found that children in kinship foster care
experience greater placement stability than children placed with
nonrelative foster parents.86 Mounting evidence indicates, however,
that the incentives favoring kinship foster care delay reunification
of foster children with their parents, and studies in several states
show lower reunification rates for children placed with relatives.8 7
Additionally, kinship foster care also appears to increase the
racial disparity in length of time spent in foster care.8" Black
children already stay in foster care for almost twice as long as all
other children.89 Furthermore, numerous national and state studies
have linked race to the length of time spent in foster care.9° Longer
stays in foster care contribute to racial disproportionality because
they increase the number of black children in the system in any
given year.91 Indeed, some experts believe that exit dynamics, rather
than rates of entry, more consistently explain why these children
are overrepresented in the foster care population.92
Why might kinship foster care increase the racial gap in chil-
dren's lengths of stay in foster care? Delays in reunification may
stem from financial incentives that cause families to prefer that
children remain with kin caregivers because they receive higher
foster care stipends. In California, for example, children in kinship
care receiving foster care benefits were half as likely to be reunited
86. See, e.g., Andrew Zinn et al., A Study of Placement Stability in Illinois 30 (Chapin Hall
Ctr. for Children at the Univ. of Chi., Working Paper, 2006), available at http://www.
chapinhall.org/articleabstract.aspx?ar=1423.
87. Gleeson et al., supra note 71, at 803.
88. Fred Wulczyn, Closing the Gap: Are Changing Exit Patterns Reducing the Time
African American Children Spend in Foster Care Relative to Caucasian Children?, 25 CHILD.
& YOUTH SERVS. REv. 431, 444-45 (2003); see also Mark F. Testa, The Changing Significance
of Race and Kinship for Achieving Permanence for Foster Children, in RACE MATTERS IN CHILD
WELFARE, supra note 1 (noting that the gap in legal permanence for children in kinship care
tends to reduce over time).
89. See Berrick, supra note 73, at 82; see also Steven L. McMurtry & Gwat-Yong Lie,
Differential Exit Rates of Minority Children in Foster Care, 28 SOC. WORK RES. & ABSTRACTS
42, 42 (1992) (noting that black children stay in foster care one year longer than white
children).
90. Mark E. Courtney & Vin-Ling Irene Wong, Comparing the Timing of Exits from
Substitute Care, 18 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REv. 307, 317 (1996); McMurtry & Lie, supra note
89, at 42.
91. See generally McMurtry & Lie, supra note 89 (discussing exit rates from foster care
and the high proportion of black children in foster care).
92. See Wulczyn, supra note 88, at 434.
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with their parents after four years as were children in kinship
homes receiving lower welfare benefits.9" The disparity in benefits
had the greatest impact on black families.94 Jill Berrick found that
"African-American children in kinship homes supported by the
foster care subsidy remained in care approximately twice as long as
all other children."95 Prolonged involvement in the formal foster care
system can be conceptualized as the price families must pay to
receive the level of financial support needed to care for children.9" At
the local level, the Woodlawn women involved in kinship foster care
were experiencing the intense contradiction of being paid to care for
their own brothers and sisters, nieces and nephews, cousins, and
grandchildren, while having to accept more state surveillance,
which they resented.97 Yet, this was the price for receiving more
state support, which they needed.98
I do not see the contradictions expressed by Woodlawn residents
as an indictment of kinship foster care. Rather, relative caregiving
is a traditional African American arrangement that provides
children with greater stability and connections to their families and
communities than non-kin foster care.99 Child welfare agencies
should therefore attempt to place foster children with relatives, and
then generously support those families. The contradictions de-
scribed above, however, illustrate the flaw in child welfare policies
that provide more assistance to children in kinship foster care than
to children who are in the care of their extended families and
parents. Families should receive the financial benefits and support
services offered to foster parents without the prerequisite of placing
children in state custody.
III. CHILD WELFARE'S PARADOX AND THE FLAWED SAFETY NET
Child welfare's dual nature as investigator and service provider
has been intensified by the dwindling safety net in poor inner-city
93. Berrick, supra note 73, at 82.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Roberts, supra note 65, at 1631.
97. Roberts, supra note 16, at 18-22, 36-41.
98. Id. at 36-41.
99. See Coupet, supra note 75, at 416-18; Scannapieco & Jackson, supra note 72, at 191-
92.
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neighborhoods. Furthermore, the child welfare system's racial
geography is connected to the geography of social service provision.
In his three-city study of social service providers in the wake of
welfare reform, political scientist Scott Allard discovered a striking
mismatch between neighborhood need and access to support
services such as substance abuse treatment, food assistance, job
training, education, and emergency aid.1 °° Residents of poor black
neighborhoods like Woodlawn have especially inadequate access to
these services.0 1
Allard also found that distance from services had serious
consequences for residents' economic opportunities. 10 2 Spatial
proximity to services helped determine utilization of services among
those women receiving welfare."0 3 Living closer to employment
opportunities also increased recipients' chances of finding a job and
leaving welfare.'0 4 According to Allard, under welfare-to-work
programs, "the lack of proximity to relevant social service providers
is tantamount to being denied aid."' ' Moreover, the neighborhoods
that Allard discovered as lacking in social service access were
precisely the ones experiencing intense concentrations of child
welfare agency involvement. 106 Given this decline in access to social
services, it is no wonder that the women interviewed in Woodlawn
looked to DCFS for needed financial support.
The increasingly paradoxical relationship between poor families
and the child welfare system suggests that we need to change our
view of the system's institutional function. In poor African American
neighborhoods where most cases are concentrated, child welfare
100. SCOTT W. ALLARD, BROOKINGS INST., ACCESS TO SOCIAL SERVICES: THE CHANGING
URBAN GEOGRAPHY OF POVERTY AND SERVICE PROVISION 13 (2004), available at
http://www3.brookings.edu/ metro/pubs/20040816_allard.pdf.
101. See SCOTT W. ALLARD, OUT OF PLACE: THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF WELFARE POLICY
(forthcoming 2008) (examining poor black neighborhoods similar to Woodlawn).
102. ALLARD, supra note 100, at 13.
103. See Scott W. Allard, Richard M. Tolman & Daniel Rosen, Proximity to Service
Providers and Service Utilization Among Welfare Recipients: The Interaction of Place and
Race, 22 J. POLY ANALYSIS & MGMT. 599, 610 (2003).
104. See generally Scott W. Allard & Sheldon Danziger, Proximity and Opportunity: How
Residence and Race Affect the Employment of Welfare Recipients, 13 HOUS. POLY DEBATE 675
(2003).
105. ALLARD, supra note 100, at 3.
106. See generally Allard et al., supra note 103 (analyzing whether spatial proximity to
social services impacts utilization of social services among welfare mothers).
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agencies function as much as economic safety nets as child protec-
tion services. Unfortunately, social scientists and feminist theorists
pay little attention to the public child welfare system's role in
supporting caregiving by poor mothers. Although fewer families are
involved with child protection services than with TANF, 107 the
number of children in state custody is staggering. In 2005 alone,
there were more than half a million children in foster care.0 8
Indeed, given the astronomical decline in the number of TANF
recipients in the last decade,'0 9 the gap in the size of the two
systems of family aid is likely to shrink dramatically. With welfare
rolls slashed by the 1996 welfare law, social programs dwindling,
and desperate poverty increasing, child welfare agencies are
increasingly important sources of aid.
CONCLUSION
Having stripped Woodlawn, like other inner-city neighborhoods,
of social programs, low-income housing, and guaranteed public
assistance, the state is relying more than ever on the punitive
system of foster care to address the needs of struggling single
mothers and their children. The contradictions expressed by the
women in my Woodlawn study reflect these tradeoffs, created
because foster care constitutes a critical means for addressing
parental poverty in their neighborhood. Poor families are left in the
bind of resenting child welfare agencies' surveillance and interfer-
ence, yet wanting the agencies' continued presence as one of the
few remaining sources of public aid. Moreover, the child welfare
system's racial geography shows that the agencies' role as a safety
net will be most prominent in black neighborhoods, where high
rates of foster care, unemployment, and inadequate social services
107. Gibbs et al., supra note 76, at 436-38 (stating that more than 500,000 children being
cared for by relatives receive child-only TANF grants, some of which are outside the child
welfare system).
108. There were 513,000 children in foster care on September 30, 2005. ADMIN. FOR
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, supra note 2, at 1.
109. See OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES PROGRAM (TANF): SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT
TO CONGRESS I-1 fig.A (2006), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa
annualreport7/TANF 7thReportFinal1lO1006.pdf (showing TANF recipients and families
peaking in the early 1990s and declining since then).
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converge. As this Essay demonstrates, the growing yet overlooked
role of child welfare agencies in the shrinking welfare state only
heightens the tensions inherent in the U.S. approach to child
welfare.
The paradoxes discussed in this Essay intensify the need for
radical reform of the child welfare system. At the heart of these
contradictions are the punitive stipulations for receiving aid,
including relinquishing custody of children to the state, and the
state's unwillingness to provide needed support directly to poor
families. Eliminating the source of tension within the child welfare
system should be a central focus of change. Devising voluntary ways
to address family poverty before a child-endangering crisis occurs
-with the aim of generously supporting families' care of chil-
dren--could accomplish this change. For example, some states and
localities have employed strategies to address racial disparities that
make communities central partners in developing policies and
practices and that include community-building initiatives that
expand the resources available to families." 0 Others have imple-
mented programs that provide subsidies and support services to
relative caregivers comparable to what they would receive through
foster care, but without the "requirement that children remain in or
come from state custody.""' We should work to transform the child
welfare system into a community-based institution that generously
and non-coercively supports families.
110. CENTER FOR COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS IN CHILD WELFARE, PLACES To WATCH:
PROMISING PRACTICES To ADDRESS RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY IN CHILD WELFARE (2006),
available at http://www.cssp.org/uploadFiles/Promising-Practices-to-Address_Racial_
Disproportionality.pdf; U.S. GOV'T ACcOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AFRICAN AMERICAN CHILDREN IN
FOSTER CARE: ADDITIONAL HHS ASSISTANCE NEEDED To HELP STATES REDUCE THE
PROPORTION IN CARE (2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07816.pdf.
111. Coupet, supra note 75, at 457 (discussing the District of Columbia's Grandparent
Caregivers Pilot Program Establishment Act of 2005); see also Susan L. Brooks & Dorothy E.
Roberts, Social Justice and Family Court Reform, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 453, 456-57 (2003)
(discussing the Tennessee Relative Caregivers Program).
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